Durational Residence Requirements for Candidates
In the summer of 1972, the Democratic party of Missouri charged that
the Republican candidate for governor, Christopher S. Bond, failed to
satisfy the provision of the state constitution requiring the governor to
have been "a resident of this state at least ten years next before election."' Although Bond had maintained substantial ties to his home state
of Missouri, he had spent five of the previous ten years outside the state
as a student, law clerk, and lawyer, and there was some question whether
his contacts with Missouri were such as to make him a resident for the
required period. The Missouri Supreme Court, which was asked to
settle the dispute, had recently ruled that a similar durational residence
requirement for state legislators was valid. 2 In Bond's case, however, the
Court avoided the constitutional issue by finding that Bond had been a
resident of Missouri for the statutory period.3 Bond was elected governor in November, 1972.
Almost all state constitutions contain durational residence requirements, which provide that a citizen must have lived in the polity for a
defined period before he may either vote or be a candidate for public
office. These requirements are commonly justified on three grounds:
first, they are designed to discourage election fraud by voters and candidates; second, they assure voter and candidate identification with community interests; and third, they ensure that voters are knowledgeable
about candidates and issues and that candidates are aware of the problems and attitudes of the community. In the 1968 general election,
durational residence requirements for voting denied the franchise to
between five and eight million otherwise qualified citizens.4 Congtess
subsequently provided in the Voting Rights Act of 1970 that, for voting
in presidential elections, these requirements must be limited to a
thirty-day registration period." Between 1968 and 1972, durational residence requirements for voting in state and local elections were challenged in the courts," and in March, 1972, the Supreme Court, in Dunn
1 Mo. CONsr. art. 4 § 3.
2 State ex rel. Gralike v. Walsh, 483 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. 1972).
8 State ex rel. King v. Walsh, 484 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. 1972).
4 See generally Cocanower & Rich, Residency Requirements for Voting, 12 Aiuz. L. REV.
477, 478 (1970); Comment, Residence Requirements for Voting in PresidentialElections, 37
U. Cm. L. REv. 359 (1970).
5 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(a)(1).
6 See note 54 infra.
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v. Blumstein,7 declared that the requirements are unconstitutional
restrictions on the rights to vote and travel. The Court held that bona
fide residence and a minimal registration period are the only permis8
sible residence limitations on the franchise.
There has also been a series of cases in both federal and state courts
challenging durational residence requirements applicable to candidates
for public office. Some courts have extended to the candidacy problem
the reasoning and analysis of Dunn and the voting rights cases on which
it was based, and have held durational residence requirements for candidates to be unconstitutional. Other courts have upheld the requirements, drawing a sharp distinction between the right to vote and the
right to be a candidate for office. 9 This comment discusses the origins of
the right to vote and the attack on durational residence requirements
for voting that culminated in the Dunn decision. It reviews the history
of the right to vote, the right to be a candidate, and the right to travel.
It concludes that the right to vote and the right to run for office are so
closely interconnected that the Supreme Court's decision in Dunn
necessarily implies that the restrictions imposed on the right to be a
candidate are unconstitutional as well.
I. TnE RIGHT TO VOTE
The suffrage has traditionally been, as the word implies, a matter of
legislative grace. Although James Madison argued in 1787 that "the
right of suffrage is . . . a fundamental article of republican govern-

ment,"1 0 the states at that time limited the franchise to white male freeholders" or to males possessing property of a specified value. 12 Article I,
section 2 of the Constitution guaranteed the right to vote only in
federal elections; even then, the states were allowed to define the
scope of the federal right, since the electors were required to have
"the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch
of the state legislature."' 13 The right of suffrage was commonly held
7 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
S The Supreme Court has recently ruled that a fifty-day registration period is permissible, Marston v. Lewis, 93 S. Ct. 1211 (1973); Burns v. Fortson, 93 S. Ct. 1209 (1973).
9 See note 97 infra. See generally Note, DurationalResidence Requirements for State and
Local Office: A Violation of Equal Protection? 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 996 (1972); Comment,
The Demise of the DurationalResidence Requirement, 26 Sw. L.J. 538 (1972).
10 Tim FmERausr No. 52, at 326 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). As early as 1702, Chief Justice
Holt stated that "the right of voting . . . is a thing of the highest importance, and so
great a privilege, that it is a great injury to deprive the plaintiff of it .... " Ashby v.
White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 136 (Q.B. 1702).
'1 E.g., N.C. CoNsr. art. VII (1776).
12 E.g., N.J. CONsr. art. IV (1776) (£50 required).
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to be a concommittant of state, but not of federal, citizenship. The
great reluctance of Congress and the federal courts to intervene in matters of states' rights effectively barred federal regulation of state elec4
toral laws.'
The phrase "right to vote" was not specifically mentioned in the
Constitution until the ratification, in 1868, of the fourteenth amendment, which articulated a constitutional concept of national citizenship. 15 The ramifications of the amendment on state power to limit the
franchise, however, were long held in abeyance. 0 For fifty years, courts
invoked either article I, section 2'7 or the fifteenth amendment I8 to
protect the franchise of black citizens. They continued to hold that the
states had the power to define electoral qualifications so long as the laws
were not racially discriminatory.' 9 In Pope v. Williams, for example,
the Supreme Court ruled that the right to vote "in a state is within the
jurisdiction of the State itself, to be exercised as the State may direct,
and upon such terms as to it seem proper ....-20 The Court stressed
that "the Federal Constitution does not confer the right to vote upon
21
any one."
22
The "white primary cases" of 1927 and 1932, Nixon v. Herndon
and Nixon v. Condon,23 marked a decisive change in the Supreme
Court's theories concerning protection of the franchise. In Herndon,
Justice Holmes invoked the fourteenth, rather than the fifteenth,
amendment to invalidate Texas laws that prevented blacks from voting
in the state's Democratic primary. Employing the traditional notion that
'3

U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 2.

14 In Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833), Chief Justice Marshall held that
the Bill of Rights was inapplicable to the states, citing the states' rights disputes in the
Constitutional Convention. Although the franchise was one of the "privileges and immunities" protected by article IV, section 2 of the Constitution, according to Corfield v.
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825), two other early cases specifically
excluded the franchise from constitutional protection, Abbot v. Bayler, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.)
89 (1827); Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535 (Md. 1797).
15 US. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1; see H. WECHSLER, TnE NAIONALIZATION OF CIvIL
LIBErrY AND CIVIL RGHTS (1968).
16 The decision in The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1870), that the
fourteenth amendment applied only to racial discrimination was instrumental to this
narrow interpretation of the amendment.
17 Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900); Ex
parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
18 U.S. CONsr. amend. XV. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
19 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876);
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875).
20 193 US. 621, 632 (1904).
21 Id. at 633.
22 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
23 286 US. 73 (1932).
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the amendment was directed, in particular, to racial discrimination, the
Court held that the Texas statutes violated the equal protection clause.
Subsequently, in UnitedStates v. Classic,4 the Court was asked to apply
an equal protection rationale to protect against an infringement of the
right to vote that was not based on racial considerations. 25 The Court
continued to look, however, to article I, section 2 as the source of Congress's authority to regulate elections to federal offices, and held that this
authority extended to congressional primary elections. Perhaps more
importantly, the Court remarked that "the rights of voters.., to have
their votes counted is... a right secured by the Constitution, ' 2 and
indicated that under article I, section 2, vote fraud would not be allowed to dilute the effectiveness of the franchise.27 In 1958, however,
the Court reaffirmed the states' power to regulate the franchise subject
to specific constitutional limitations. In Lassiterv. Northampton County
Board of Elections,28 it upheld a state statute requiring prospective
voters to qualify for the franchise by passing a literacy test, because the
test was "neutral" with regard to race.
Since Lassiter, the Court's notions about constitutional limitations
on the franchise have changed considerably. The two decades after
Classic saw a vigorous academic discussion of the equal protection doctrine in many areas of the law,29 and in Baker v. Carr,3 0 the Supreme
Court for the first time indicated that it would invalidate a nonracial
restriction on the right to vote. The Court reasoned that if dilution of
votes by a false tally was impermissible in Classic, so also was the effective dilution of votes that occurred when counties with greatly varying
populations elected the same number of representatives to the state
legislature.
Baker's protection of the right to vote for state officers was expanded
by the Court in Reynolds v. Sims,8 ' which enunciated the one-man
one-vote concept and declared Alabama's post-Baker plans for reapportionment to be constitutionally infirm. The progressive expansion of the
2A 313 US. 299 (1941).
25 Id. at 829.
26 Id. at 315.
27 In this spirit, the Texas Democratic primary system was once again invalidated in

Smith v. Allwright, 321 US. 649 (1944). In that case, and in yet another Texas white
primary case, Terry v. Adams, 545 U.S. 461 (1953), the Court renewed its commitment to
protecting the right to vote.
28 360 US. 45 (1959).

29 See, e.g., Tussman & ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 87 CAL. L. REv.
341 (1949); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAav. L. R v. 1065 (1969).

369 US. 186 (1962).
81 377 US. 533 (1964).
30
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suffrage in the fifteenth, seventeenth,3 2 nineteenth,33 twenty-third, 4 and
twenty-fourth 5 amendments led the Reynolds Court 36 to declare that
"every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation
in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies . . .- 17 In
previous cases, the Court had not enunciated an affirmative right to
vote; the equal protection clause applied only when the state granted
the right to vote to some citizens, but denied it to others in an impermissible fashion. In Reynolds, however, the Court ruled that "[t]he
right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of
a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart
of representative government . . ."38 and that the right to vote had
attained a constitutional stature that entitled it, under the fourteenth
amendment, to protection against abridgement by the states. Finally,
Reynolds announced that the rational basis test, which had long prevented close scrutiny of the validity of state action under the equal protection clause, is not applicable in voting rights cases. Seizing upon the
celebrated dictum in Yick Wo v. Hopkins 9 that voting is "a fundamental political right because preservative of all rights," 40 the Court
declared that because voting is such a "fundamental matter in a free and
democratic society,... any alleged infringement thereof must be care41

fully and meticulously scrutinized."
The right to vote rationale and the strict scrutiny test that Reynolds
announced were first applied to voter residence requirements in Carringtonv. Rash.42 In that case, an army sergeant who had been stationed
in Texas for more than a year challenged the constitutionality of a
Texas law that denied the franchise to members of the armed forces who
were not residents of Texas at the time of their induction. The state
32

U.S. CONs.

amend. XVII.

3 U.S. CONsr. amend. XIX.
34 U.S. CoNsr. amend. XXII.
35 U.S. CONSr. amend. XXIV.

36 377 U.S. at 555 n.28.
37 Id. at 565. This tendency toward expansion of the suffrage was noted by Toqueville:

Once a people begins to interfere with the voting qualification, one can be sure that
sooner or later it will abolish it altogether ... The further the limit of voting rights
is extended, the stronger is the need felt to spread them still wider; for after each new
concession the forces of democracy are strengthened, and its demands increased with
its augmented power. The ambition of those left below the qualifying limit increases
in proportion to the number of those above it.... fTjhere is no halting place until
universal suffrage has been attained.
A. DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 60
88 377 U.S. at 555.
39 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
40 Id. at 370.

41 377 U.. at 561-62.
42 380 U.S. 89 (1965).

U.

Mayer ed. 1969).
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defended the statute on the ground that the measure prevented bloc
voting by servicemen and protected the local electorate from irresponsible transients. The Court found this justification insufficient: "'Fencing out' from the franchise a sector of the population because of the
way they might vote is constitutionally impermissible." 43 In Reynolds,
equal protection had been held to prevent dilution of the vote; in
Carrington,it was held to limit the state's power to determine the extent
of the franchise.
Since Carrington,the Court has further strengthened the right to
vote in state and local elections. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections4 4 invalidated Virginia's poll tax for state and local elections on
the ground that "once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines
may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection
Clause." 45 Although it recognized that the equal protection clause historically had not been applied to laws regulating the franchise, the
Court explained that "[n]otions of what constitutes equal treatment for
the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause do change." 46 In Williams
v. Rhodes,47 the Court continued to ignore the rational basis test in
voting rights cases. Since Ohio could not demonstrate the "compelling
interest" 48 necessary to support an abridgement of voting rights, the
state's nominating petition requirements and write-in prohibitions were
overturned. Soon after Williams, the Court explained that the rational
basis test is predicated upon an assumption that in a republican form
of government, institutions of state government are structured to represent all the people fairly. Where, however, it is just this assumption
that is contested, only a compelling state interest can justify the imposi49
tion of voting restrictions.
In this series of cases-Baker, Reynolds, Carrington, Harper, and
Williams-the majority of the Court was prepared to place the
individual's right to vote above the state's right to regulate and limit
43 Id. at 94.
44 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
45 Id. at 665.

46 Id. at 669 (emphasis in original).
47 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
48 Id. at 31. In Williams the Court examined three factors in order to determine whether
a law violates the equal protection clause: (1) the facts and circumstances behind the law,

(2) the interests that the State claims to be protecting, and (3) the interests of those disadvantaged by the classification. Id. at 30.
49 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). See also City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Cipriano v.

City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). But see Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 93 S. Ct. 1237 (1973); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist., 93
S. Ct. 1224 (1973).
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the franchise. During the same period, in the Voting Rights Acts of
1965 and 1970, Congress acted to protect and to expand the franchise, placing statutory limitations upon the traditional authority of the
states. It would be wrong, however, to suggest that the constitutional
basis of the right to vote and of the power of Congress to regulate the
franchise has thus far been clearly defined. In 1970, in Oregon v. Mitchell,5 o the Supreme Court upheld that part of the Voting Rights Act of
1970 limiting state durational residence requirements in presidential
elections to a thirty day registration period. In their several opinions,
the Justices revealed a wide divergence of views as to the basis and extent of the federal right to vote and of Congress's power to protect that
right. Justice Black found the power of Congress to originate in article
I, section 4 and the necessary and proper clause, and to be limited by
article I, section 2 to federal elections. 51 Justice Harlan found congressional power, under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, only to
regulate racially discriminatory election laws.3 Justices Brennan and
Douglas found that Congress's power was grounded on the fourteenth
amendment and that the right to vote applied to all elections, state and
53
federal.
Even before Oregon was decided, cases involving durational residence
requirements for voters began to enter the federal courts. During the
period 1968-1971, nineteen cases involving these provisions were decided: nine courts held the laws unconstitutional; ten courts held them
constitutionally sound. 54 The issue reached the Supreme Court in
50
51
52
53

400 US. 112 (1970).
Id. at 119-20, 125.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 135, 278. For extended discussions of the legislative history of the fourteenth

amendment, see C. FAImMA,

VI HISTORY OF THE SUPREME CouRT OF THE UNnTm STATES

1207-1300 (1971); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. RIv. 5 (1949); Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress, 1965 S. CT. Rav. 33. The Court has not demanded that each vote for a given
office be absolutely equal to every other such vote. In Mahan v. Howell, 93 S. Ct. 979 (1973),
the Court determined that a reapportionment plan for the Virginia state legislature was

constitutional, even though the population of the most underrepresented district exceeded
that of the most overrepresented district by 16.4 percent. The Court relied extensively on
the language of Reynolds for its conclusion that while "substantial equality" of population is necessary in state legislative districts, "absolute equality" of representation is not
compelled by the Constitution.
54 Unconstitutional: Andrews v. Cody, 327 F. Supp. 793 (M.D.N.C. 1971), aff'd mem.,
405 U.S. 1034 (1972); Keppel v. Donovan, 826 F. Supp. 15 (D. Minn. 1970), af'd mem., 405
U.S. 1034 (1972); Lester v. Board of Elections, 319 F. Supp. 505 (D.D.C. 1970), vacated, 405
U.S. 1036 (1972); Bufford v. Holton, 319 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Va. 1970), aff'd sub nom.
Virginia Bd. of Elections v. Bufford, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972); Kohn v. Davis, 320 F. Supp. 246
(D. Vt. 1970), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1034 (1972); Affeldt v. Whitcomb, 319 F. Supp. 69 (N.D.

364
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Dunn v. Blumstein,55 a suit initiated by a Vanderbilt University law
professor who moved to Tennessee in June, 1970. Blumstein was not
allowed to register to vote in the August primary election because of
a Tennessee requirement that a resident live in the state for one year
and in the county for three months in order to be eligible. In a suit
for declaratory and injunctive relief, the district court held that the
Tennessee durational residence requirements violated the equal protection clause.56
By a vote of six to one, the Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Marshall's
majority opinion began by noting that millions of citizens were affected
by durational residence requirements for voting simply because they
were newcomers, and then discussed the action and intent of Congress
when it abolished these requirements in presidential elections. Citing
Yick Wo and Reynolds, the Court said that the right to vote in state
and local elections is a fundamental right. According to the Court,
Tennessee's laws infringed not only this right to vote, but also the
constitutional right to travel. When such fundamental rights have been
infringed, the Court stated, "it is not sufficient for the State to show
that durational residency requirements further a very substantial state
interest;" a compelling interest is required. 57 And because the state's
asserted interests-assuring the purity of the ballot box and a wellinformed electorate-were, in the Court's opinion, insufficient, the
state's requirements violated the equal protection clause. 58
Ind. 1970), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1034 (1972); Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala.
1970), aff'd mer., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972); Blumstein v. Ellington, 337 F. Supp. 323 (M.D.
Tenn. 1970), aff'd sub noma. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Burg v. Canniffe, 315
F. Supp. 380 (D. Mass. 1970), af'd mem., 405 U.S. 1034 (1972); Keane v. Mihaly, 11 Cal.
App. 8d 1037, 90 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1970). Constitutional: Fontham v. McKeithen, 336 F.
Supp. 153 (E.D. La. 1971); Anderson v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 1195 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Ferguson
v. Williams, 330 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Miss. 1971), vacated and remanded, 405 U.S. 1036
(1972), rev'd, 343 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Howe v. Brown, 319 F. Supp. 862 (N.D.
Ohio 1970); Piliavin v. Hoel, 320 F. Supp. 66 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Cocanower v. Marston,
318 F. Supp. 402 (D. Ariz. 1970), vacated and remanded, 405 U.S. 1036 (1972); Epps v.
Logan (Civil No. 9137) (W.D. Wash. 1970); Fitzpatrick v. Board of Election Comm'rs, (N.D.
Ill. 1970), cited in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333-34 n.3 (1972); Sirak v. Brown
(Civil No. 70-164) (S.D. Ohio 1970); Rabin v. Onondaga Co. Bd. of Elections, 37 App. Div.
2d 471, 326 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1971). Several years before Dunn, the Supreme Court had affirmed without opinion a decision that durational residence requirements for voters were
permissible, Druedling v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Md. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 380
U.S. 125 (1965). In 1969, in Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969), the/Court refused another opportunity to settle the question of durational residence requirements for voters.
55 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
56 Blumstein v. Ellington, 337 F. Supp. 323 (M.D. Tenn. 1970).
57 405 U.S. at 337.
58 Post-Dunn decisions that have held durational residence requirements for voters to
be unconstitutional include: Hinnant v. Sebesta, 346 F. Supp. 913 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Nicholls
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The Court in Dunn did not, of course, discuss the issue of the validity
of durational residence requirements for candidates. In holding similar
laws impermissible when applied to voters, however, the Court clarified
three issues vital to the question of candidate durational residence
requirements. First, the decision indicated that the Supreme Court
continues to oppose unnecessary restraints on the exercise of political
rights; second, the decision further developed the right to travel, which
may invalidate some residence restrictions on candidacy; and third, the
Court again demonstrated that the compelling interest test is to be
applied to laws infringing the right to vote.
II.

THE RIGHT TO BE A CANDIDATE FOR PUBLIC OFFICE

Just as many courts held before Dunn that the right to vote in state
and federal elections was neither federal nor fundamental, several courts
have recently held that there is neither a federal right nor a fundamental right to be a candidate for public office. It can be contended,
however, that the right to be a candidate and the right to vote are, in
fact, two aspects of the same general political right. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, James Wilson argued "agst. abridging the
right of election in any shape. It was the same thing whether this were
done by disqualifying the objects or the persons chusing."'50 Alexander
Hamilton, defending the Congress against those who feared it would
be "aristocratic," stressed that "the true principle of a republic is that')
the people should choose whom they please to govern them ....This
great source of free government, popular election, should be perfectly
pure, and the most unbounded liberty allowed."'00 Whether the people
chose to elect an aristocrat or a poor tradesman was a matter for the
people to decide. James Madison, responding to a similar objection to
Congress-fear of oligarchical control-said: "Who are to be the objects
of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may recommend him to
the esteem and confidence of his country."'61 Congress would not become
an oligarchy because its members would be drawn from all the people.
v. Schaffer, 344 F. Supp. 238 (D. Conn. 1972); State v. Van Dort, 502 P.2d 453 (Alas. 1972);
Jarmel v. Putnam, - Colo. -, 499 P.2d 603 (1972); Chapman v. Foote, - N.H. -, 293
A.2d 772 (1972); Application of Atkin v. Onondaga County Bd. of Elections, 30 N.Y.2d 401,
285 N.E.2d 687, 334 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1972); Moen v. Erlandson, 80 Wash. 2d 755, 498 P.2d 849
(1972); Delgiorno v. Huisman, 498 P.2d 1246 (Wyo. 1972).
59 1 M. FARRAND, R CORDS OF THm FEDERAL CONVENTION 375 (1937 ed.).
60 2 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTTunoN 257 (1836 ed.).
01 THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 351 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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The makers of the Constitution recognized that the nexus between
voter and candidate was practical as well as theoretical, that the state
could restrict the scope of the franchise by simply imposing severe
qualifications for candidacy.
During the debates of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, the
right to vote and the right to be a candidate were frequently treated not
as distinct constitutional concepts, but rather as a single broad political
right-"the right to vote and hold office."'62 Although both the Senate
and House versions of the fifteenth amendment originally contained a
prohibition against denial or abridgement of the "right to vote and
hold office" on racial grounds, 63 the final version returned from conference extended constitutional protection only to the franchise.6 4 This
radical change was accepted by many Republicans only because, had
they rejected it, action on the amendment would have been postponed
until the next session of Congress, 65 and postponement, in turn, would
have given the forces opposing the amendment more time in which to
solidify opposition to the racial policies of the Radical Republicans.
Some Senators were undisturbed by the alteration because they thought
that protection of the right to vote would effectively protect the right
to hold office as well. 66
Other senators were less optimistic about the deletion from the
amendment of the "essential republican principle" 67 of the right to
hold office. Senator George F. Edmunds, for example, remarked: "If
you give [a citizen] the right to have a voice in the government, that
voice cannot have any live expression unless it enables him to choose
. . . the man who suits him for his representative, instead of confining
him, as this amendment does, to a chosen aristocratic class."168 Black

men were guaranteed the right to vote, but not the right to vote for
black men. By removing the right to be a candidate from the scope of
the fifteenth amendment, Congress enabled southern states to subvert
the intent of the amendment by restricting to a class hostile to his interests the candidates for whom the black man could vote. Thus, at
least some of the Radical Republicans were aware that the right to be
a candidate is not less fundamental than the right to vote and that the
See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., d Sess. 670, 983, 985 (1869).
Id. at 1318 (Senate version), 1428 (House version).
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV, § 1.
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., d Sess. 1626-29 (1869).
66 Id. at 1629.
67 Id. at 1628.
68 Id. at 1626.
02
63
64
65
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one may not be subjected to harsh restriction if the other is to escape
similarly harsh restriction. 69
In several of its recent voting rights cases, the Supreme Court has
recognized, at least implicitly, the complementary nature of the two
rights, and in the process of protecting the right to vote, the Court has
given substantial protection to the right to be a candidate. In Williams
v. Rhodes,70 the Court was concerned with state requirements that denied to some parties and candidates equal access to the general election
ballot. The requirements were found to infringe two kinds of rights.
First, the Court held that Ohio's system of qualifying petitions and its
prohibition of write-in candidates stifled the growth of minor political
parties, a result that violated the freedom of speech and association guaranteed by the first amendment. The Court also found that the Ohio
system infringed the rights of voters to "cast their votes effectively." 7'1
Although the Court did not explicitly discuss the right to be a candidate, it recognized that the right to vote is functionally dependent upon
the ability of candidates to place their names before the electorate. By
depriving some parties and candidates of equal access to the ballot,
Ohio was held to have deprived hundreds of thousands of voters of their
right to an effective exercise of the franchise.
More recently, in Turner v. Fouche,72 the Court explicitly recognized
that there exists a right to be a candidate, a right protected, in some
measure at least, against infringement by the state. Turner involved a
challenge to a requirement that all members of a Georgia county schoolboard be freeholders; the requirement effectively excluded from the
office most of the county's black majority. In striking down the requirement, the Court assumed that no person has a right to be appointed to
public office. It went on to say, however, that "the appellants and members of their class do have a federal constitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory
disqualifications ... .,,73 Thus, the Court did not specifically identify
69 In the early debates on the fifteenth amendment, for example, Senator Edmund G.
Ross discussed the Georgia constitution, which allowed black men to vote, but denied them
the right of candidacy: "Black men are denied the right to hold office now, the next step
will be to take from them the ballot, and the next their freedom." Id. at 983.
70 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
71 Id. at 30. The Williams philosophy effectively replaced that of Snowden v. Hughes,
321 U.S. 1 (1944), in which the Court held that the right to be a candidate was not a federal right, but a concomitant of state citizenship, and thus susceptible to extensive state
regulation.
72 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
73 Id. at 362.
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the right of candidacy as a fundamental right, but described it as "federal" and "constitutional." And since it found the freeholder requirement constitutionally impermissible under the rational basis test, the
Court did not need to decide whether the compelling state interest test
ought to be applied to state restrictions on candidacy. In subsequent
cases dealing with freeholder requirements, the lower courts have cited
Turner for the proposition that candidacy is a fundamental right.
These courts have, therefore, applied the strict equal protection standard to the requirements in question and have uniformly held them
74
invalid.
Finally, both the Supreme Court and lower courts have dealt with
the right to be a candidate in cases involving challenges to the filing
fees that many state and local governments exact from candidates who
want to have their names appear on the ballot. The courts have upheld
such fees so long as there is provided a reasonable alternative means,
such as a nominating petition, by which a candidate's name may be
placed on the ballot.7 5 But where no reasonable alternative is available,
the courts have consistently intervened to protect the right of candidates to run and of voters to vote.7 6 Thus, the Supreme Court in Bul74 Socialist Workers Party v. Welch, 334 F. Supp. 179 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Ducantell v. City
of Houston, 333 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Anderson v. City of Belle Glade, 337 F.
Supp. 1353 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Connerton v. Oliver, 333 F. Supp. 201 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Moore
v. Board of Elections, 319 F. Supp. 437 (D.D.C. 1970); Gonzales v. City of Sinton, 319 F.
Supp. 189 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Stapleton v. Clerk for City of Inkster, 311 F. Supp. 1187 (E.D.
Mich. 1970); People's Constitutional Party v. Evans, 83 N.M. 303, 491 P.2d 520 (1971);
Sorenson v. City of Bellingham, 80 Wash. 2d 547, 496 P.2d 512 (1972). See also Comment,
Equal Protection and Property Qualifications for Elective Office, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 129
(1969).
75 Ducantell v. City of Houston, 333 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Georgia Socialist
Workers Party v. Fortson, 315 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Jenness v.
Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Jenness v. Little, 306 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Ga. 1969), appeal
dismissed as moot sub nom. Matthews v. Little, 397 U.S. 94 (1970). Contra, Spillers v.
Slaughter, 325 F. Supp. 550 (M.D. Fla. 1971), vacated and remanded, 404 U.S. 806 (1972);
Fowler v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 592 (M.D. Fla. 1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 986 (1971);
Weatherington v. Adams, 309 F. Supp. 318 (N.D. Fla. 1970); Bodner v. Gray, 129 So. 2d
419 (Fla. 1961); State ex rel. Apodaca v. Fiorina, 83 N.M. 663, 495 P.2d 1379 (1971), appeal
pending sub nom. Norvall v. Apodaca, 406 U.S. 904 (1972). Courts have generally approved
requirements that candidates of minor parties and independent candidates submit petitions containing the names of a small percentage of the registered electorate, in order to
obtain a place on the ballot. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Jones v. Hare, 440
F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 911 (1972); Jackson v. Ogilvie, 325 F. Supp.
864 (N.D. Ill.
1971).
76 Brown v. Chote, 41 U.S.L.W. 4548 (U.S. May 7, 1973); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134
(1972); Socialist Workers Party v. Welch, 334 F. Supp. 179 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Ducantell v.
City of Houston, 333 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Wong v. Mihaly, 332 F. Supp. 165 (N.D.
Cal. 1971); Thomas v. Mims, 317 F. Supp. 179 (S.D. Ala. 1970); Jenness v. Little, 306
F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Ga. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot sub nom. Matthews v. Little, 397
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lock v. Carter77 held unconstitutional Texas laws that imposed filing
fees for local offices, without alternative means of getting on the ballot;
the fees, which ranged to a maximum of $8,900, represented major
portions of the salaries that the candidates would receive if elected.
The plaintiff, who did not have $8,900 to invest in a filing fee for the
primary, obtained declaratory relief from a unanimous Supreme Court.
The Court concluded that the huge size of the fees gave the system a
"patently exclusionary character."7 8 Texas argued that the fees assured
the seriousness of candidates. The Court rejoined that even poor candidates can be serious ones, and that poor voters have a right to vote
for one of their own: "the rights of voters and the rights of candidates
do not lend themselves to neat separation." 79 The Court found that the
avowed revenue-raising rationale for the legislation was impermissible,
since the state could raise money otherwise than by burdening the
franchise and could regulate the ballot in a more reasonable or less
exclusionary manner.6 0
Williams, Turner and Bullock imply that the right to be a candidate
for public office is as fundamental as the constitutional right to vote.8 '
III. THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Durational residence requirements arguably conflict not only with
the right to run for office that has been developed, but also with the
right to travel, a right to which the Supreme Court has given increasing
U.S. 94 (1970); Zapata v. Davidson, 24 Cal. App. 3d 823, 101 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1972); State
ex rel. McIntyre v. Mininni, 32 Ohio St. 2d 17, 288 NE.2d 816 (1972).
77 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
78

Id. at 143.

70 Id.
80 In Zapata v. Davidson, 24 Cal. App. 3d 823, 101 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1972), the court relied

on Bullock to void a filing fee of $300. Even this fee, according to the court, was "patently
exclusionary" with respect to poor candidates. In Brown v. Chote, 41 U.S.L.W. 4548 (U.S.
May 7, 1978), the Court unanimously affirmed and remanded for a trial on the merits a
preliminary injunction forbidding California from imposing a $425 filing fee on a prospective candidate for Congress.

81 In addition, Williams indicates that the freedom of an individual to gather supporters and declare himself a candidate derives, not only from the right to vote, but also

from the rights of free speech and association guaranteed by the first amendment, since
there would be little substance to a right to form political parties if no member of the
party had a constitutionally guaranteed right to represent his party as a candidate. Williams v. Rhodes, 898 U.S. 28 (1968). See also Mancuso v. Taft, - F.2d - (1st Cir. 1978);
Miller v. Bartunek, 349 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Socialist Workers Party v. Martin,
345 F. Supp. 1132 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Ducantell v. City of Houston, 333 F. Supp. 978 (S.D.
Tex. 1971). In Rosario v. Rockefeller, 93 S.Ct. 1245 (1978), however, the Court held that
a New York statute requiring voters who wish to vote in a party primary to declare their
party affiliation eight to eleven months before the primary, did not abridge the freedom of
association protected by the first amendment.
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recognition and protection. The right to travel from state to state has
long been thought to be a fundamental American liberty,8 2 in part
because geographical mobility has been a continual and significant
characteristic of the American people. The Magna Carta faintly alluded
to a right to conduct commerce freely within the Kingdom,83 and by
the time the Pennsylvania constitution was ratified in 1776, this notion
had expanded into a "natural inherent right to emigrate from one state
to another ...

whenever citizens think that thereby they may promote

their own happiness."8 4 During the Constitutional Convention of 1787,
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, proponents of the federalist
idea of national citizenship, opposed all residence and long citizenship
requirements for Congressmen because such laws would discourage
men of intelligence and merit from moving from state to state, or from
Europe to the United States.8 5 With the victory of the Jeffersonian
Republicans, however, notions of states' rights crippled the federal right
to travel-as well as the federal right to vote.
Although the right to travel is nowhere specifically mentioned in the
Constitution, it has been thought to inhere in the nature of the Union, 8
to be a fundamental personal right,8 7 or to be a privilege and immunity
of national citizenship guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment or by
article IV, section 2.88 The Supreme Court has maintained the right in
a line of cases including Crandall v. Nevada in 1867,9 Shapiro v.
Thompson in 1969,90 and the abortion cases of the current term. 91 The
nature of the Union interpretation was expounded by Chief Justice
Taney in his dissent in the PassengerCases:92 "For all the great purposes
for which the Federal government was founded, we are one people,
with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States;
and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass
82 For a more detailed discussion of the right to travel, see Comment, The Right to
Travel: Another Constitutional Standard for Local Land Use Regulations?, 39 U. CH. L.
REv. 612 (1972).
83 A. HOWARD, THE RoAD FROm RUNNYMEADE 214 (1968).
84 PA. CONsr. ch. I art. XV (1776).
85 2 M. FARRAD, supra note 59, at 268. The right to travel was listed as a constitutionally protected "privilege and immunity" in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3230)
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825). The first major "right to travel" case did not come down until the
post-Civil War period of nationalism. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
86 See, e.g., Edwards v, California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
87 See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 380, 338 (1972).
88 See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973). See also Kurland, The Privileges and Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at Last"?, 1972 WAsH. U.LQ. 405.
89 78 US. (6 Wall.) 85 (1867).
90 594 US. 618 (1969). See also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
91 Doe v. Bolton, 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973).
92 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
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and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as

in our own States." 03
The Supreme Court in Dunn found the freedom to travel to be a
fundamental personal right, and applied the compelling state interest
to durational residence requirements for voters. The Court declared
that "such laws force a person who wishes to travel and change residences to choose between travel and the basic right to vote." 94 By classifying residents on the basis of recent travel, the requirements in effect

penalized the exercise of the fundamental right to travel; the loss of
political rights made more costly the assertion of the right to move from
one place to another. Since one right was conditioned on the loss of
the second right, the Court held that both were infringed; this infringe-

ment was unconstitutional since the state could not demonstrate a substantial interest in support of its laws.
In Green v. McKeon,95 the Sixth Circuit, relying on the reasoning
in Dunn, found that durational residence requirements for candidates,
like durational residence requirements for voters, burdened the right
to travel by forcing potential travelers to choose between moving to the
polity and participating as a candidate in the political process. The
court held that the requirements were incapable of serving the state's
asserted interest-assuring knowledgeable candidates--and that, therefore, the state's interest could not justify the burden on the right to
travel that the requirements imposed. Furthermore, the Green court
concluded that the "voters are the final arbiters of a candidate's ability
to carry out the duties of a particular office, and the matter should be
left to their consideration."9 6 These arguments, made in defense of the
right to travel, also drew upon the principles of the right to vote and
the right to be a candidate cases in order to hold durational residence
requirements for candidates unconstitutional.
IV.

DURATIONAL RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR CANDIDATES:

EQUAL PROTECTION AND POLICY

The disagreement among the lower courts as to whether durational
residence requirements for candidates are constitutionally permissible
centers on two issues: whether the state's requirements burden fundamental rights and, if they do, whether the state can demonstrate an in97
terest sufficiently compelling to justify the burden.
93 Id. at 492.
04 405 U.S. 830, 342 (1972).
965 468 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1972).
96 Id. at 885.
97 The cases holding durational residence requirements for candidates unconstitutional
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Burdens on Fundamental Rights

Because they discern a qualitative difference between the right to
vote and the right to be a candidate, some courts have refused to denominate the right to be a candidate a fundamental right9 8 They have
argued that while the right to vote, as enunciated in Dunn, is a doctrine
vital to maintaining the legitimacy of government and the freedom of
the individual, deprivation of the right to be a candidate does not deny
the citizen a choice in government, and so does not raise questions of
legitimacy or individual liberty. On the other hand, courts that have
condemned durational residence requirements either have, followed
Turner and considered the right to run for office "as fundamental a
right as the right to vote,"0' 9 or have interpreted the right of candidacy
as a necessary adjunct to the right to vote.100
The courts have differed, in particular, as to whether durational
residence requirements unconstitutionally burden either the right to
be a candidate or the right to vote. It has been argued that the right to
vote is not abridged by a durational residence requirement for candidates because the requirement does not prejudice a discrete class of
voters. If members of the Socialist Workers' party, for instance, were
disqualified as candidates, there would be some question that they
would be elected in any event, but there is little question that, if elected,
they would pursue different courses of action than the Democrats
are: Green v. McKeon, 468 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1972); Wellford v. Battaglia, 843 F. Supp.
143 (D. Del. 1972); McKinney v. Kaminsky, 340 F. Supp. 289 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Mogk v.
City of Detroit, 35 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Bolanowski v. Raich, 30 F. Supp. 724
(E.D. Mich. 1971); Camara v. Mellon, 4 Cal. 3d 714, 484 P.2d 577, 94 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971);
Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4 Cal. 3d 716, 484 P.2d 578, 94 Cal. Rptr. 602 (1971); Lawrence v. Cleveland, 18 Cal. App. 3d 127, 91 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1970). Cases upholding the constitutionality
of the requirements include: Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1121 (D.N.H. 1973); Walker
v. Yucht, 352 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1972); Draper v. Phelps, 351 F. Supp. 677 (W.D. Okla.
1972); Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970), appeal dismissed as moot, 401
U.S. 968 (1971); Gage v. Allison, 22 Cal. App. 3d 85, 99 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1972); Hayes v. Gill,
52 Haw. 251, 478 P.2d 872 (1970), appeal dismissed as moot, 401 U.S. 968 (1971); State ex
rel. Gralike v. Walsh, 488 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. 1972); Jordan v. Meisser, 29 N.Y.2d 661, 274
N.E.2d 444, 824 N.Y.S.2d 954 (1971), appeal dismissed as moot, 401 U.S. 907 (1972). Earlier
cases include: Lindsey v. Dominguez, 217 Cal. 533, 20 P.2d 827 (193); Blount v. Board of
Supervisors of Elections, 247 Md. 342, 230 A.2d 689 (1967); Stothers v. Martino, 6 N.J. 560,
79 A.2d 857 (1951); DeHond v. Nyquist, 65 Misc. 2d 526, 818 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1971). All
courts that have invalidated durational residence requirements have dealt with local ordinances while those courts that have dealt with requirements contained in state constitutions have upheld the requirements.
98 E.g., Draper v. Phelps, 851 F. Supp. 677 (W.D. Okla. 1972); Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F.
Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
99 Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4 Cal. 3d 716, 728, 484 P.2d 578, 585, 94 Cal. Rptr. 602, 609 (1971).
100 Mogk v. City of Detroit, 35 F. Supp. 698, 700 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
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or Republicans elected in their place. To deny Socialist Workers the
right to be candidates would be to deny any sort of meaningful vote to
a member of the party. There is, however, no discrete class of transients
or new residents for which denial of the right to be a candidate would
be outcome-determinative. There is no indication that new residents,
as a class, vote differently from longtime residents, or that citizens excluded from office by a durational residence requirement would act
differently from native citizens actually elected.
According to this argument, the Supreme Court was concerned in
Williams and Bullock with state restrictions that significantly affected
the quality of the franchise. Where, however, as in the requirement of
nominating petitions in Jenness v. Fortson,'0 the state law has no "real
or appreciable" effect upon voters, the Court has upheld the legislation.
By the same token, since durational residence requirements for candidates have no real or appreciable effect on the outcome of an election,
they cannot be held to infringe the right to vote.
The answer to this argument cannot be based on empirical data
demonstrating that, had certain potential candidates not been excluded
from the ballot by durational residence requirements, so many voters
favored them that they would have been elected. But the lack of such
empirical data is not dispositive of the issue. If a state were to deny the
right to vote to all residents whose surnames began with the letter A,
few courts would hesitate to condemn the legislation as a violation of
the equal protection clause. The denial of the franchise on the basis of
recent interstate travel, although less arbitrary, is no more outcomedeterminative than is the denial of the franchise on the basis of one's
surname. Unless there is some correlation between surnames beginning
with A and a given political issue or philosophy, the same candidates
should be elected whether or not these people vote.
Basing a right to vote or a right to be a candidate on outcome-determination is constitutionally unsound. These rights are derived from
principles of democracy that have been found to inhere in the Constitution; they should not depend on the utility of their exercise. Durational residency requirements exclude a class of citizens from candidacy
for public office, and by excluding this class from candidacy, the requirements may exclude another class from a full and efficacious exercise of
the franchise. There should be a presumption that both of these exclusions are constitutionally significant and constitutionally forbidden.
When the Supreme Court has approved a state requirenlent that the
101 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
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candidate submit a nomination petition demonstrating a modicum of
voter support, the Court has dealt with the problem of allocation of
places on the printed ballot. 102 A candidate who fails to satisfy the petition requirement may continue as a write-in candidate: to hold otherwise would be to deny the "right to vote freely for the candidate of one's
choice" enunciated in Reynolds and Williams. Durational residence
requirements for candidates absolutely deny voters the right to vote for
a class of candidates; the analogy is not only to nominating petitions,
but to a ban on write-in votes as well.
It has also been argued that electoral restrictions based on length of
residence in a locality are not permanent-disqualifications inflicted on
those concerned. Unlike classifications based on race or sex, restrictions
based on residence can last only for a few months or years. The citizen
need do nothing to free himself from the disability except reside in the
locality for the requisite period. Durational residence requirements for
candidates do not, therefore, affect the exercise of political rights sufficiently to render the requirements constitutionally impermissible.
This argument ignores, however, the Court's conclusion in Dunn that
even the temporary deprivation of political rights is constitutionally
significant. When a candidate is excluded because of a durational residence requirement, his right to be a candidate is absolutely denied for
the purposes of that election. When a voter cannot vote for the candidate of his choice, Williams indicates that his right to vote in that election has been absolutely abridged.
Durational residence requirements for candidates restrict the right
to vote, the right to travel, and the right to be a candidate. Insofar as
they restrict the former two rights, they abridge liberties commonly
acknowledged to be fundamental in nature. Insofar as they restrict the
right to be a candidate, the requirements infringe upon a right widely
held to be fundamental in itself, as well as through its relation to the
suffrage. Once it has been established that durational residence requirements affect fundamental rights, the question becomes whether the
laws are useful and effective legislation, and if so, whether they are
sufficiently necessary to justify the restriction of important political
rights.
B.

Justifications for Durational Residence Requirements

The courts use three standards for evaluating state legislation that
allegedly violates individual liberties.10 3 The first standard, the "tradi102 Id. at 431.

103 See generally, Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Hv.
L. R~v. 1 (1972).
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tional equal protection standard" or the "rational basis test," is invoked
when the individual right involved is not deemed to be fundamental
in nature. In order to satisfy this test, the state must show that
its laws are intended to serve a legitimate state interest, such as assuring
knowledgeable candidates for public office, and that the laws are a
rational means to achieve the state's permissible ends. During the 1960s,
the Supreme Court developed a second standard-the "compelling interest test"-to apply when state legislation conflicts with fundamental
rights. In order to satisfy this stringent standard of review, the state
must demonstrate that its laws serve a compelling public interest and
that they conflict as little as possible with fundamental rights. The
Court has recently begun to develop a third equal protection standard,
the "reasonably necessary" test of Bullock v. Carter.0 4 This test, a
middle ground between the two standards described above, was applied by the Court in Bullock to a law affecting the right to be a candidate. The new standard assumes the validity of the state's goals, and
instead looks to whether the state's action is an efficient means of attaining them; if it is not, then there is no justification for abridging individual liberties.
The justifications for candidate durational residence requirements
can be categorized as follows: (1) tradition-durational residence requirements are found in almost every state constitution and have been
an integral part of the American political system since the founding of
the Republic; (2) candidate knowledge-the state must ensure that candidates are knowledgeable with regard to the issues, the problems, and
the desires of their prospective constituents; (3)assimilation-the candidate must live in the community long enough to feel himself a member
thereof, if he is to represent his constituents adequately.
Tradition has frequently been cited as a justification for retention
of the durational residence requirement. Nearly every state constitution
contains such provisions, 10 5 and these provisions have been retained
and even extended in recent constitutional revisions. 06 The work of so
07
many capable legislators should not be undone precipitously.
The tradition rationale must be refuted on its own terms, by invoking
tradition. Although most state constitutions contain durational residence requirements, the United States Constitution does not; it requires
only that senators and representatives be of a minimum age and be
citizens of the United States for a given period, and that they be bona
104 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972).
105 See Appendix.
106 See, e.g., ILL. CoNsr. art. 5, § 3 (1965); MICH. CONsr. art. 5, § 22 (1963).
107 State ex rel. Gralike v. Walsh, 483 S.W.2d 70, 76, (1972).
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fide residents of their states on the date of election.108 During the discussion of article I, section 2 at the Constitutional Convention of 1787,
John Rutledge of South Carolina moved that a durational residence
requirement of seven years be included in the article, as "[a]n emigrant
from N. England to S.C. or Georgia would know little of its affairs and
could not be supposed to acquire a thorough knowledge in less time." 10 9
George Mason of Virginia agreed that "[i]f residence be not required,
Rich men of neighbouring States, may employ with success the means
of corruption in some particular district and thereby get into the public
Councils after having failed in their own State." 1 0 Thus, both the
"knowledgeable candidate" and the "assimilation" arguments were
advanced to the convention.
In the debate that followed these proposals, some delegates opposed
the motions on the ground that they would "interweave local prejudices
& State distinctions in the very Constitution which is meant to cure
them.""' Although most delegates said nothing on the subject, the
motions were soundly defeated. 112 And as noted above," 8 in another
session of the convention both Madison and Hamilton strenuously opposed such residence requirements because such legislation would
discourage capable men from moving from state to state or from Europe
to the United States.
It is possible to argue that, despite the actions of the convention and
the attitudes of the Founding Fathers, the Constitution in fact contains
the federal equivalent of the states' durational residence requirements
-- the citizenship requirement of seven and nine years." 4 It can be
argued that durational residence requirements are needed to insure
that, for example, an Illinois candidate is an Illinoisan and not a
Californian or a New Yorker. But a Californian is not a "foreigner"
in Illinois in the same way that a Swede is a "foreigner" in the United
States; the problems of knowledge, acculturation, and loyalty are very
different. This distinction, which both Madison and Hamilton recognized, was strengthened by the fourteenth amendment's definition of
national citizenship. In Dunn the Supreme Court struck down durational residence requirements for voters even though such requirements
are as traditional as similar requirements for candidates. The defense
108 U.S. CoNSr. art. I, §§ 2-3.
109 2 M. FARaAND, supra note 59, at 217.

1o Id. at 218.
111 Id. at 217.
112 Id. at 219.
113 See text at note 85 supra.
114 U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 2-3.
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of candidate residence requirements on the basis of tradition should
similarly be rejected.
The most frequent and most compelling justification for durational
residence requirements for candidates is that they insure the candidate's
knowledge of the problems and desires of his constituency. 1 5 Closely
related to this is the assimilation argument-that residence requirements insure that candidates' attitudes conform to those of the community. Courts that have upheld the requirements have relied primarily
on the theory that if states have any power at all to regulate the electoral
process, they should be able to set candidate qualifications so that a
candidate can be presumed to possess a working knowledge of his
constituency in order to represent it adequately.
The durational residence requirement has been held, on this ground,
to satisfy the rational basis test because, even if some long-resident
candidates may not be as well-informed as some new arrivals, the law
is nevertheless reasonably related to its legitimate purpose of candidate
knowledge."16 Many migrants will not possess sufficient knowledge or
identification with the community to fulfill the function of public
office if they were elected; durational residence requirements successfully exclude these unfit people from candidacy.
7 however, the Supreme Court determined that
In Turner v. Fouche,"1
Georgia's freeholder requirement for county school board candidates
was not only unnecessary to any compelling state interest, but also was
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of a valid state objective. Georgia
could not demonstrate a rational basis for the law because it could not
demonstrate that a nonfreeholder who is also a parent with children in
the local schools, or a tenant who pays the landlord's property taxes with
his rent would discharge his responsibilities as an elected official in a
less responsible manner than a freeholder. The same argument might
be applied to durational residence requirements for candidates. The
requirements create, in effect, a nonrebuttable presumption that, if
elected, a new resident, because he is new, cannot be a responsible
115 The constitutionality of durational residence requirements for candidates has also
been defended on the ground that they are necessary to insure voter knowledge of the
candidate. Draper v. Phelps, 351 F. Supp. 677 (W.D. Okla. 1972); Hadnott v. Amos, 320
F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970). Hadnott involved a candidate for circuit judge in rural
Alabama. The court concluded that, in such circumstances, if the voters did not know the
candidate personally or by word of mouth, they were not likely to know him at all. It held
that a durational residence requirement is a reasonable tool to ensure that voters can make
informed use of their franchise.
116 Draper v. Phelps, 351 F. Supp. 677 (W.D. Okla. 1972); Hadnott v. Amos, 820 F. Supp.

107 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
117 396 U.S. 846 (1970).
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public official. The state presumes that, once elected, the migrant would
not possess knowledge of the area sufficient to make him an effective
official and that he would fail to demonstrate the identification with
the polity necessary to protect its interests adequately. In order to be
elected, however, a candidate, migrant or native, must demonstrate
some knowledge of his electorate and some identification with its
political beliefs-at least knowledge and identification greater than
that of his opponents. It can be argued, therefore, that it is irrational
for the state to conclude that a candidate who gains the support of the
electorate is ignorant of the problems and attitudes of the community.
Under the rule of Turner, durational residence requirements for can'idates may therefore fail to satisfy the traditional rational basis test.
It has been argued that the knowledgeable candidate rationale satisfies
the compelling state interest test since it protects the public, not against
a few ill-considered votes, but against the much more serious consequences that could result from the election of ignorant or incompetent
public officials. But it seems clear that durational residence requirements for candidates fail to satisfy either of the strict equal protection
standards. The compelling interest standard demands not only that
the state's goal be compelling, but also that the state use the least restrictive means of achieving it."18 The requirement that a candidate live
in the state or district for a given period, however, excludes some informed and capable newly domiciled citizens from even the opportunity
for public office; at the same time, the requirement does not prevent
the candidacy of longtime residents who have heretofore taken no
interest in local problems. The law is, therefore, at once overbroad
and underinclusive: competent men are exclqded frbm candidacy, while
ignorant men may offer themselves for election free of restraint. 1 9 If
the fundamental rights to vote and to be a candidate are to be denied
to some citizens, the state must employ a more efficient means of
attaining its ends.
The policy argument against durational residence requirements for
candidates, whether they are tested under the traditional rational basis
test or the new stricter standards, rests on the assumption that the voter
is better able than residence requirements to discriminate among candidates on the basis of their knowledge, ability and attitudes. A candidate with no knowledge of local problems has little chance at the polls,
118 Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4 Cal. 3d 719, 723, 484 P.2d 578, 582, 94 Cal. Rptr. 602, 606
(1971).
119 E.g., Green v. McKeon, 468 F.2d 883, 885 (6th Cir. 1972); Mogk v. City of Detroit,
335 F. Supp. 698, 700 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
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whether he is a newcomer or a native. A candidate who is newly arrived
in the area will almost certainly be branded a "carpetbagger" by his
opponents and must demonstrate his expertise and interest to a skeptical
electorate if he is to be elected.
The failure to include a durational residence requirement in article I,
sections 2 and 3 has enabled a number of recent migrants to be elected
to Congress from their new home states.' 20 In recent years, the outstanding result of this omission is the candidacy and election, in 1964, of
Robert F. Kennedy as Senator from New York. Kennedy, who had
hitherto lived in Virginia and voted in Massachusetts, decided to seek
the Democratic nomination for the Senate sometime in the summer
of 1964. He leased a house on Long Island on August 24, declared his
candidacy on August 25, won the nomination on September 1, and
defeated incumbent Senator Kenneth Keating in the November
election.
Kennedy's nomination resulted, a New York Times editorial pointed
out, from a combination of his own attractiveness as a candidate and
the absence of such attractiveness in native New York Democrats.-2 '
This seems to be the situation that Madison had in mind-the able
outlander coming to offer himself as a candidate in a locality where
capable men are needed. Senator Keating made it clear that his opponent was not a native New Yorker, 122 and attempted to show Kennedy's ignorance of New York problems and his basic lack of interest
in the state, except as a steppingstone to the presidency.'2 8 Kennedy
answered that he had long been interested in national issues-poverty,
race relations, urban problems-that were relevant to the basic problems of New York.124 He stressed that although he had previously lived
in Virginia, New York was now his home and that he would defend
25
the interests of his home state'
The force of the knowledgeable candidate argument depends on what
a "representative" is.126 If the representative is to be guided primarily
by his own views of the national interest, he needs to know less about
his particular constituency than he would if he is to reflect faithfully
the opinions or particular interests of those who elected him. Even if
120 For example, the first senator from New York, Rufus King, was a resident of Massachusetts until shortly before his election. N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1964, at 25, col. 7.
121 N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1964, at 38, col. 1.
122 N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1964, at 28, ol. 1.
123 N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1964, at 1, col. 6.
124 N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1964, at 30, col. 3.
125 N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1964, at 30, col. 4.
126 See generally H. Prrax, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967).
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the latter interpretation is accepted, however, it is doubtful that a
potential candidate is necessarily lacking in the knowledge and attitudes
required to represent a community's interests simply because he has
only recently come to reside there. In our society, problems and attitudes
are seldom limited to a single community. For example, all large cities
have similar problems, so that a man moving from Chicago to Detroit,
who studied these problems in Chicago, could well be a more desirable
and informed candidate than a migrant to Detroit from rural Michigan
with little experience of the city, and more desirable yet than a native
of Detroit who had previously been interested only in the Detroit
Tigers. Yet state and local durational residence requirements operate
to treat each of these three hypothetical candidates differently. The
question is where to draw the line: at the Detroit city limits, at the
Michigan state line, or at the United States border.
C.

An Alternative: Bona Fide Residence
Although the Court in Dunn declared durational residence requirements for voters to be unconstitutional, the Court also held that the
state could impose a brief registration period-in effect, a brief durational residence requirement-for the purpose of determining whether
a voter is a bona fide resident.127 Durational residence requirements for
candidates should be treated in similar fashion. If bona fide residence
were not required, a political hopeful could be a candidate in a promising constituency, and if defeated, immediately go elsewhere. This sort
of abuse is obviated by the requirement of bona fide residence, a requirement that courts have universally approved. 128 Since states and
cities have the power to demand that a candidate be a bona fide resident,
they should be allowed sufficient time to ensure that the qualification
has been satisfied. The maximum of time allowable for such certification
should be the minimum period that the administrative process requires.
Other administrative details, such as the printing of ballots with the
candidate's name, must be considered. Although some flexibility might
be in order, allowing a state to require four months or six months
residence would subvert the principles that support abandoning durational residence requirements.
405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); see note 8 supra.
128 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Green v. McKeon, 468 F.2d 883, 885
(6th Cir. 1972); Ramsey v. Rockefeller, 348 F. Supp. 780 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The bona fide
residence requirement for candidates is discussed extensively in Note, The Durational
Residency Requirement as a Qualification for Candidatesfor State Legislature: Violation
of Equal Protection?22 SYRAcusE L. REv. 1079 (1971). But see Doe v. Bolton9
739
(1973).
127
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V.

CONCLUSION

It is the spiritual outsider, the person with new ideas, whom states
and cities often exclude through durational residence requirements.
In Williams, Ohio attempted to exclude all but the Republican and
Democratic parties from the political process. Williams invalidated
those laws because they stifled the right of the voters to choose how the
political system should evolve. Turner and Bullock turned back attempts by states to make legal participation in the political system a
function of wealth. Durational residence requirements have the same
effect, if not the same form, as freeholder requirements and large filing
fees. They limit the choice of candidates as far as possible to those
who are "safe," or as the states themselves might prefer, "proven," rather
than leaving judgment on the relative merits of candidates to the
electorate. Durational residence requirements for candidates for public
office are not only poorly designed to further legitimate state interests
in assuring competent public officials, but they also infringe on the
right to vote, the right to travel, and the right to be a candidate. The
bona fide residence requirement Pasures sufficient identification of an
individual with a given polity and should be the maximum constitutional limitation that may be placed on both the fundamental political
rights to vote and to be a candidate.
Edward Tynes Hand
APPENDIX
DURATIONAL RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS

This table lists in years each state's durational residence requirement
for governor and for the lower house of the state legislature. Where the
qualification "elector" appears, a citizen was required, until Dunn, to
be a resident in the state for periods of six months to one year before
he could register to vote in that state.
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State

Governor

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts

7
7
5
7
5
2
elector
6
7
6
5
2
3
5
2
none
6
10
5
5
7
elector
for
4 years
1
5
10
2
5
2
7
7
5
5
2
5
none
10
3
7
elector
5
2
7
5
5
45

Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

State Representative
in state
in district
3
3
3
2
3

1
1
1
1
1
1

2

elector

2
2
2
3
21
52
1

1
elector
1
elector

-

2
1
6lodays
eector

2
5
1
8

1
2
8 months
1

~1
-elector

1

4
2

2
2
5
2

4
elector
2
8
2

3

2
elector

elector
5elector
5

1

6 months
2
1
1
1

elector
resident
1
resident
1
1
elector

1
6 months
1

1
elector
elector
I
1
1
1

elector
1
elector
1

